Thursday, August 18, 2011

THE INVESTIGATIVE POWER OF CONGRESS


A politically-interested friend of mine randomly asked me why does congress, our legislative body, conducts investigations. Since an investigation, according to him is judicial in nature. I guess this is a significant question since ordinary citizens can always see these hearings in TV and its proceedings are the meat of late night news. His question is a good topic to elaborate and in the broader light, every citizen must at least have a basic understanding of the powers of congress for them to better engage the law-makers and the law-making process. The spirit of the question asks about the investigative powers of congress.


The legislative investigation is enshrined in Article 6, Section 21 of the Constitution:


The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.


Why is there a need for Legislative Investigations?


Arnault v. Nazareno[1] states the foundation of the power of legislative investigation. The court said through Justice Ozaeta that the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information - which is not in frequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. In simpler and general terms; for congress to make good laws, it needs good information from the once that implements it. Thus legislative investigation is that tool to extract information.


What do you mean by “Aid of Legislation”?


In aid of legislation serves as a limitation to the broad investigative powers of congress, so as the publishing of the rules of procedure and the protection of the rights of persons. “In aid of legislation” is an essential element in the jurisdiction of the legislative body. Moreover, it is not necessary that every question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation.[2] “In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited form a single question.[3]


Does the absence of published rules, as cited in the constitutional provision, bar congress from investigation?


The second limitation speaks of the need to publish the rules of procedure regarding legislative inquiry. The need for publication became a focus in the case of Neri v. Senate case. This case states that the Senate currently conducting the investigation had not published its rules. The Court emphasised that publication gives the notice that is required for due process since investigation can affect the rights of non-members of congress. In effect, in the absence of published rules, investigation cannot proceed.[4]


What is the basis of congress to contempt people under investigation?


The third limitation of the power of legislative inquiry concerns the protection of the rights of persons articulated in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. However, corollary to the protection of individual rights in the exercise of their investigative power, it should also be understood that Congress can hold people in contempt in its judgement. Jurisprudence provides that the congress in its right of self-preservation can impose penalty in its existence or while in session.

Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteers is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.[5] The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.[6] This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such a penalty is the right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable during the existence of the legislative body. [7]


The power to contempt is articulated further by Arnault vs. Nazareno. The petitioner argued that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session. According to the Supreme Court:


That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be avoided. As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.


Who is exempt from Legislative Inquiry?


The President, on whom executive power is vested, is beyond the reach of Congress, except through the power of impeachment. It is based on the President's position as the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. Members of the Supreme Court are exempt from this power of inquiry on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.[8]


Conclusion


The power of inquiry flows from the fundamental principle of the separation of powers which our Constitution enshrines. It enables the legislative branch of government to do its job with precision under the delicate relationship with the other co-equal branches of government and the limitations of the power set forth in Article 6, Section 21 of the Constitution. For ordinary citizens, it is important to understand that the law-making process entails vast powers which if unchecked, can invade and insult our individual rights and freedoms. Legislative inquiry as an implied power of the legislature should be at its best, supported for it aids in creating good laws, and at its worst, guarded for it can be a tool to play circus among the self-interests and passions of law-makers.


[1] 87 Phil. 29, 45 (1950)


[2] BERNAS, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p.760, 2009 Ed.


[3] 87 Phil. At 45.


[4] BERNAS, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p.762, 2009 Ed.


[5] McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L.ed.,580; 50 A.L.R.,1.


[6] Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheaton, 204; 5 L. Ed., 242.


[7] Avancwna, C.J., concurring in Lopez v. De los Reyes, 55 Phil. 170, 186 (1930)


[8] Sabio vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 174318, October 17, 2006

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